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T HE CASES reviewed in the text and footnotes of this Survey are col-
lected under the following headings: Construction of Instruments;
Procedural Matters; Taxation; Contractual Wills; and Trusts.
I. CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS
Construction continues to be a major source of controversy. The need
for care in the use of words and in the drafting of clauses is indicated by
the issues in the following cases decided during the year under review.
In Jones v. Walter' H. J. and Genevieve were husband and wife. H. J.
died in January 1959; his niece, Helen Jones, died in November 1959,
leaving her entire estate to her husband, Leslie. H. J.'s wife, Genevieve,
died in 1965. The third paragraph of H. J.'s will left his property to his
wife, "with full right and title thereto." The fourth paragraph provided
that if Genevieve be deceased when H. L.'s will was offered for probate,
and upon her death "if any property be remaining," then the estate was
to pass to designated parties. A clause then provided that if a legatee be
deceased, then his interest should be vested in his heirs. Helen's husband
sought to claim her interest as beneficiary under Helen's will.
The Texas supreme court by a six-to-two opinion construed the fourth
paragraph as follows: The devolution of H. J.'s property depended on
either of two contingencies: (1) the death of Genevieve before H. J.'s
will was offered for probate; (2) the death of Genevieve after the will
was offered for probate. The latter contingency having occurred, the
next clause of paragraph four provided for vesting in Helen's heirs. Helen,
having predeceased Genevieve, had no interest to devise; H. J.'s will pro-
vided that in such case Helen's interest was defeated and such interest
passed to her heirs. The court construed the will of H. J. as vesting a re-
mainder interest in Helen subject to defeasance by Genevieve's exercise of
her power of disposition or subject to defeasance by Helen's death before
Genevieve, in which case Helen's heirs took under H. J.'s will. Thus, this
interest did not pass to devisees under Helen's will.
Watten burger v. Morris' involved the interrelationship between a will
and its codicils. The testator, Owen, Sr., made material provisions for his
three sons in a will executed in 1944. In this will he established a trust
in certain real estate for twenty-five years and a trust in certain money
for twenty years. Owen, Jr. died in 1951 leaving three children surviv-
ing. Owen, Sr. thereafter in 1954 executed a codicil stating that it was his
"desire, in lieu of all bequests" which Owen, Jr.'s children would have
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University; S.J.D., Har-
vard University. Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
' 436 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1968).
2436 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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under the original will, that such children of Owen, Jr. would receive
$2,000 each. After Owen, Sr. died in 1960, the executors of his estate
paid the children of Owen, Jr. $2,000 each and obtained releases from
them.
In about five years both of Owen's other two sons died, leaving children
surviving. The children of Owen, Jr. sought to participate in Owen, Sr.'s
will, contending, among other things, that the codicil was merely preca-
tory by reason of the use of the word "desire." The court of civil appeals,
in affirming the trial court's take-nothing judgment against Owen Jr.'s
children, held that in this case "desire" was used in the codicil in a man-
datory sense. Even if the codicil was construed to be precatory, the court
held that the children of Owen, Jr. were in any case precluded from tak-
ing anything under the will because they had elected to take under the
codicil in which the words "in lieu of" were meant to be a substitute.
Morris v. Finkelstein' involved the interrelationship of two paragraphs
in a will. In paragraph II the testator bequeathed $10,000 to his brother
Morton, provided that if the brother should predecease him, the testator
then gave the specific bequest and the residue of his estate to Jack "as
hereinafter set out in paragraph III below." Both Morton and Jack sur-
vived. Morton contended that, read together, paragraphs II and III should
be construed as vesting the residue in Jack only in the event Morton pre-
deceased the testator. Because Morton survived the testator, Morton con-
tended that he was entitled to the bequest of $10,000 and that the balance
of the estate passed by intestacy. The court of civil appeals held that the
testator wanted to avoid intestacy as to any part of his estate. Accord-
ingly, paragraphs II and III should be read as vesting the residue in
Jack in any event and in addition paragraph II provided that he should
receive the $10,000 bequest if Morton had predeceased the testator.
In another case, the language of the document was insufficient to avoid
intestacy as to the residue. In Alexander v. Botsford the testatrix left a
holographic will in which she made certain bequests of property and then
provided in part as follows: "I give Charles complete power of attorney
[.. land] after all bills are paid I ask Charles to help Truitt, Jr. in any
way he needs . . .,
A nonjury trial resulted in a novel judgment that the above language
should be construed as leaving the residuary estate in trust for the benefit
of Truitt, Jr. for life with discretion in the trustee to distribute income
and corpus to Truitt, Jr. as the latter's needs required. Upon Truitt, Jr.'s
death the remainder was to go to the testatrix's heirs at law. In reversing
the trial court, the court of civil appeals acknowledged that there is a
strong presumption that a testator intends to dispose of his entire estate,
and that if possible the court should try to find support for such a disposi-
tion. The court stated, however, that such a presumption is not strong
enough to empower a court to write a residuary clause when there is
3442 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.




none. The court also rejected the contention of Charles that the words
"complete power of attorney" should be construed as a devise and bequest
of the residue. The words "ask Charles to help Truitt, Jr." were merely
precatory and insufficient to create a trust.
A will leaving "my home and acreage in Section 19 ...to be used for
a home for aged white men" and providing that the "revenue from my
Royalties are to be left in trust ... for the use and benefit of the home for
aged white men" was effective to create a public charitable trust.6 As to
other property owned by the testatrix not covered in the will, she died
intestate. The cy pres doctrine permitted the court to delete the word
"white" so that the trust could validly continue.'
Rule in Shelley's Case. When a person takes an estate for life with re-
mainder to his heirs, or heirs of his body, the familiar rule in Shelley's
Case determines the devise or conveyance as one in fee simple. By statute
the rule has been abrogated in Texas effective as to conveyances taking
effect on and after January 1, 1964.' In a case involving the application of
the rule prior to that date the court had before it a joint will of husband
and wife leaving their estate to one another for life with life estates in
their children, "and at the death of either of them, the share bequeathed to
such child, shall pass to and vest in fee simple in the heirs of their body,
and in the event that either of our said children shall die without issue, then
the share herein bequeathed to them shall be divided equally between the
children of our surviving children."' The court held that the rule in
Shelley's Case was applicable; the use of the words "heirs of their body"
invoked the application of the rule.1" However, the subsequent language
had the effect of reducing the fee simple to a defeasible or conditional fee.
Open Mine Doctrine. In Johnson v. Messer1 the testatrix willed all her
property to John for life with power to sell or mortgage any portion
"that might be necessary for his comfortable support."1 John gave the real
estate to his wife, Esther, and thereafter oil and gas leases were executed.
There was no showing that John needed to sell the property for his com-
fortable support. Moreover, the oil and gas leases were executed after the
life estate began so that there were no wells open at the time of the testa-
trix's death. Therefore, Esther, as transferee of the life estate, had only the
income from the royalties, not the royalties themselves. "
Expectancy. Section 58 of the Texas Probate Code14 permits the devise
of an expectancy. Testator left his residuary estate to his wife. Subse-
'Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
'See Coffee v. William Marsh Rice University, 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966), error ref. n.r.e.
8TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1291a (Supp. 1969).
'Dallmeyer v. Hermann, 437 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
'
01 Id. at 371.
11437 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
12id. at 645.
"
1 See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 151 Tex. 1, 244 S.W.2d 803 (1951).
1 4 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58 (1956).
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quently, testator's unmarried sister died intestate. Testator's wife claimed
the interest that testator would have received had he survived his sister.
The court rejected the wife's contentions. At the testator's death he had an
expectancy that he might receive something from his sister. When he pre-
deceased his sister, that expectancy terminated. There was nothing, there-
fore, to leave his wife."a
II. PROCEDURE
A series of cases were decided involving procedural matters both relat-
ing to the probate of the will and the administration of the estate. Section
93 of the Texas Probate Code"0 provides that a will can be contested with-
in two years after the will has been admitted to probate or within two
years after the discovery of forgery, provided that in the case of a minor
the two-year period begins after removal of his disability. In Ladehoff
v. Ladehoff'" the Texas supreme court held that a minor who had not been
personally served but who had been represented by a guardian ad litem
had the right after attaining majority to attack the probate judgment.
The court reserved judgment on what the result would be if the minor
had been personally served.
In Corpus Christi Bank &4 Trust v. Alice National Bank 8 Mrs. East
executed a will in 1960 to which she later added four codicils. In this will
she named the Alice bank and two individuals, now deceased, as independ-
ent executors. Mrs. East died on February 11, 1961. Her 1960 will was
admitted to probate on March 6, 1961, and on June 5, 1961, an order of
the probate court approved the inventory, appraisement and list of claims
prepared by the independent executors. On July 25, 1962, a number of
heirs-at-law filed suit to set aside the probate of the 1960 will and later
in 1964 an application was made to probate a will executed in 1948. The
contestants also sought the appointment of a temporary administrator for
the purpose of filing suits to cancel certain royalty assignments executed
by Mrs. East during her lifetime. This appointment was made by the pro-
bate court in 1964, and in 1965 the Corpus Christi bank was appointed
successor temporary administrator for this purpose.
In 1968 the probate court, after a trial on the merits, declared the 1960
will invalid, admitted the 1948 will to probate, and enlarged the powers
of the Corpus Christi bank to administer the property in place of the
Alice bank, "pending the finality of this judgment determining the
merits of the will contest."'" The Alice bank appealed to the district court.
The Alice bank also sought a temporary injunction from the district
court for the period of the appeal to prevent the Corpus Christi bank
and others from attempting to interfere with the Alice bank's possession
of the estate. The district court denied the injunctive relief sought by the
" Ingram v. Medford, 440 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969).
'eTEx. PRO. CODE ANN. S 93 (1956).
'7436 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1968).
18444 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1969).
'9 Id. at 633.
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Alice bank. The court of civil appeals reversed in part by granting the
temporary injunction."
The Texas supreme court, in affirming the decision of the court of civil
appeals, reasoned that the Alice bank was appointed the independent ex-
ecutor and, after filing the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims in
1961, was entitled to represent the estate of Mrs. East free of judicial su-
pervision except where provided by statute. An independent executor can
be removed for the specific reasons set out in sections 21721 and 222 (a)1 2
of the Texas Probate Code, but none of these reasons was present here.
Section 132(a) 2  permits the appointment of a temporary administrator
until an executor or administrator with full powers has qualified. In this
case the executor had already qualified. The case is an interesting one and
suggests some matters for consideration in the drafting of clauses in wills
regarding the appointment of executors, particularly in those cases in
which a contest is contemplated. Thus, a testator might wish to affirm
clearly, as far as he can, his own desires as to the person whom he wishes
to control his estate during contest proceedings.
Other procedural cases were as follows: In a suit for construction in
which a church might participate in the estate, the church was an in-
dispensable party. 4 In another case the heirs' petition in the district court
to recover property and have an accounting from the widow-administra-
trix failed to show the necessity of intervention by the district court. The
effect of the suit was to ask for a distribution before the debts of the
estate were paid. This would take the case out of the hands of the admin-
istratrix and make the district court the administrator. The court con-
cluded that complaints about handling of funds properly belonged in the
probate court.'
Another case involved a question of offsets and credits which was first
raised in the probate court and later in the district court." The decedent's
will appointed one W. Lee Moore, Jr. as independent executor. A contest
of the will was filed by Jeanne T. Moore, and after the contest was heard
and overruled in the probate court, and such judgment appealed to the
district court, the probate court removed W. Lee Moore, Jr. as independent
executor and appointed him temporary administrator. Thereafter Mrs.
Moore filed her application for widow's allowance, which the probate court
ordered the temporary administrator to pay, less certain offsets. The order
was appealed to the district court where, after a trial de novo, a judgment
was entered and, on appeal, affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The
20 Alice Nat'l Bank v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 431 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1968), aff'd, 444 S.W.2d 632 (1969).
21 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. S 217 (1956).22 1d. § 222(a) (Supp. 1969).22 id. § 132(a) (1956).
24 Kelsey v. Hill, 433 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).2
1Click v. Neville, 431 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968); see Metting v. Met-
ting, 431 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968) (action in probate court looking to
giving of security and subsequent removal of independent executor for allowing tax lien to be-
come encumbrance belonged in district court).
2 Moore v. Ellis, 435 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968).
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supreme court refused to grant a writ of error. The temporary administra-
tor refused to pay the claim. The county clerk issued an execution.
The temporary administrator contended that the judgment was covered
by rule 3137 and that no execution should issue thereon. He also con-
tended that he was entitled to have the judgment sent back to the probate
court and reviewed in light of possible credits. On the first issue the court
held that rule 313 was inapplicable in view of the special nature and high
priority of the family allowance. On the second issue the court held that
offsets and credits had already been litigated in the probate court and dis-
trict court and were not again reviewable.
In presenting preferred claims against the estate the claimant should
consider the various options available. In Montague v. Brassell,5 when the
decedent and his former wife were divorced, he gave her a note secured
by a deed of trust on an undivided half-interest in certain royalties. After
the death of the husband the claimant's former wife had several ways in
which she could collect her claim. She had the right to proceed to sell the
mortgaged properties under the trust powers contained in the deed of
trust, or she could proceed with a judicial foreclosure, in which event an
ancillary receivership or garnishment would have been sufficient to assure
that payments which accrued during the pendency of the foreclosure pro-
ceedings would have been available for application to the debt. Rather
than pursue either of these direct methods, the claimant presented her
claim under Texas Probate Code section 306(a) (2) Y The court held that,
having chosen this course, she could not reach royalty payments received
by the executor after presentation of the claim and prior to foreclosure,
because such items were "other assets." Nor was there an issue of waste of
the security. Since the property was producing at the time the mortgage
was placed on it, the mortgagor or his estate had the right to collect the oil
runs from the property before a foreclosure sale."
Transactions between the executor or administrator and others must
meet the high standards of conduct expected of a fiduciary. In a case in
which a brother-in-law relationship existed between the administrator
and the purchaser of real estate from the estate, the court stated that
such relationship did not establish a conspiracy." Moreover, the heirs joined
in the execution of a special warranty deed to the property which was also
the subject of the administrator's deed. The acceptance by the heirs of the
proceeds of the sale estopped the heirs from asserting that the deed was
voidable.
In Estate of McKinney v. Hair" the proponent of a self-proved will was
denied probate on the grounds that the proponent (1) had failed to show
that the decedent was a resident of the county in which the will was filed
for probate, and (2) had failed to show that the will had not been re-
27 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 313 (1956).
2443 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969) (royalties received after claim presented
but before foreclosure are not reached by deed of trust sale).
" TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(a) (2) (1956).
20443 S.W.2d at 703.
3" Kemp v. Harrison, 431 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
a'434 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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voked. The court of civil appeals reversed on both grounds, holding (1)
that the testator's recitation of his residence in Falls County should be
accepted as evidence of his residence in the absence of a showing of a
change in residence before his death, and (2) that the proponent is entitled
to the presumption of continuity of the will. The contestant had the bur-
den of overcoming the presumption.
In Utay v. Urbish" the payee of a note executed an instrument which
purported to cancel a note at the death of the payee. The instrument pro-
vided that interest payments would be paid during the lifetime of the
payee and at her death the note was cancelled. After the payee's death her
administrator sought collection of the note. The court held that the docu-
ment was not testamentary in character and therefore revocable; rather,
it constituted a novation pursuant to which the parties agreed that the
note would be cancelled at the payee's death in consideration for the
maker's paying interest to the payee during her lifetime. The maker did
perform his part of the agreement by paying the interest and was en-
titled to the cancellation.
If a will was in the possession of the testator or where he had ready ac-
cess to it when last seen, failure to produce it after death raises the pre-
sumption that the testator has destroyed it with the intention of revoking
it. The proponent has the burden of proving non-revocation. If the will
was last seen in the possession of some other person, the burden shifts to
the contestant." In Citizens First National Bank v. Rushing5 a carbon of
the will was offered. The proponents contended that the original docu-
ment was last seen in the hands of another; however, even indulging every
legitimate conclusion in favor of the proponents, they had not shown by
sufficient evidence that the document last seen was in fact the original of
the carbon copy offered." Hence the proponents had the burden of proving
non-revocation.
III. TAXATION
In Wallratb v. Calvert" a brother and sister opened joint and survivor
accounts at the bank. When the sister died, the Comptroller included one
half the balance in the accounts at the time of the sister's death in her
taxable estate for inheritance tax purposes. The court of civil appeals held
that the defeasible interest acquired by the sister reverted at her death to
88433 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"
4 Aschenbeck v. Aschenbeck, 62 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1933), error dismissed.
3433 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968).
"
5 See In re Estate of Simms, 442 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969), error ref.
n.r.e. (all witnesses to alleged lost will and codicil must testify as to attestation, execution, and
the like before secondary evidence can be offered); Huckaby v. Huckaby, 436 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error ref. n.r.e. (evidence of existence of 1957 will sufficient to
support finding that 1953 will had been revoked).
3'442 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), error granted. In another tax case, United
States v, Collins, 399 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1968), the court allowed only one-half the funeral ex-
penses as a deduction in calculating the husband's taxable one-half of the community estate. The
case arose before May 27, 1967, the effective date of the amendment of TEx. PRo. CODE ANN.
5 320A (Supp. 1969) which specifically provides for the deduction of the entire funeral expenses
against the estate of deceased spouse.
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her brother; this, therefore, was a taxable event. In this case, however,
there was testimony to the effect that the brother had reservations about
the joint account when it was created; that is, the brother's testimony in-
dicated that he intended that the sister have an interest in the account for
the purpose of paying the brother's obligations if he became incapacitated.
On this basis, the case was remanded for further findings of fact.
IV. CONTRACTUAL WILLS
In last year's survey period, there had developed a rash of cases under this
topic. The issue has been less important this year. In Kastrin v. Janke"
Alexander and his wife, Lena, executed documents which were alleged to be
mutual wills, which each executed in consideration of the other. The con-
tention was that after the first one died, the survivor was bound contrac-
tually to carry out the agreement.
The court stated that the parties supporting the contractual theory have
the burden of establishing by clear and satisfactory proof that each of the
spouses made his will in consideration of the other. Two issues were sub-
mitted:
Do you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, that on or before
the 22nd day of May, 1953, [Alexander and Lena] entered into an agreement
between themselves regarding the disposition of their respective property in the
event of their death? Answer 'Yes' or 'No.' We answer 'Yes.'
If you have answered 'yes' to the preceding special issue, then but not
otherwise answer the following issue:
Special Issue No. 2
Do you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, that pursuant to such
agreement, if any, [Alexander and Lena] executed their wills dated May 22,
1953? Answer 'Yes' or No.'
We answer 'Yes.' 8'
The court held that the foregoing issues were not decisive because there
was lacking in the issues submitted the basic quid pro quo element. Had
the issues been framed in such a way as to elicit the fact of the making of
one will in consideration of the other, the result might have been different.
V. TRUSTS
Murphey v. Johnson' is an interesting case distinguishing between an ex-
press trust and a resulting trust. John and Faye persuaded Faye's parents
to convey a tract of land to obtain funds for the down payment on a
business. There was an express oral trust that John and Faye would re-
convey to Faye's parents. The business failed, and judgment was entered in
favor of a creditor. Meanwhile, John conveyed the property to his wife.
A writ of execution was issued, but prior to sale under execution Faye
conveyed the tract to her parents. The court held that, although the oral
trust was invalid under the Texas Trust Act,4 a resulting trust arose from
38 432 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
39 Id. at 542, 543.40439 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
" TEx. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-7 (1960).
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the transaction. Therefore, Faye held only legal title subject to the trust
in favor of her parents. The creditors could not reach the parents' equi-
table estate.'
First City National Bank v. Toombs"' involved the doctrine of partial
renunciation of benefits under a will. Two daughters were beneficiaries of
cash bequests under a will and were also life income beneficiaries under
testamentary trusts. The two beneficiaries accepted the cash bequests but
renounced their benefits under the trusts. The court sustained the renunci-
ations holding that if two separate and independent bequests are made to
a beneficiary, he may renounce one and accept the other. In this case both
gifts were beneficial, and neither involved burdensome features. The re-
nunciation does not result in loss or hardship to other devisees or legatees,
and nothing in the will conditioned the acceptance of one gift on the
acceptance of the other.
"For a case on the question of constructive trust, see Alexander v. Gilkerson, 433 S.W.2d 13
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
4 431 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968), error ref. fl.r.e.
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